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ABILITY TO PAY IN NEW ZEALAND'S
TAX SYSTEM
Asa Gunnarsson
This article begins with a review Of tax distribution principles and theory to provide a
framework to which the position and interpretation Of the ability to pay principle can be
related. In the next three sections I describe how the income tax base, the wealth tax and the
income support system correspond with the ability to pay principle. Finally, I look upon new
equity trends in taxation from a New Zealand perspective.
I STRUCTURES AND PRINCIPLES
The reforms of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties among the OECD countries
have been based on similar problems. The core of the problem was that the tax levels and the
income tax structures were not in harmony. A progressive tax schedule, applied on a
narrow tax base with a source dependent and source differentiated definition of income,
was highly inefficient and distorting in the Paretian sense. The income tax structure was
undermining itself. The solutions adopted can briefly be summarised: introduction of a
comprehensive income tax base that, by definition, is very close to the Haig-Simons
theoretical concept of income (net accretion of a spending unit's power to consume over some
period of time, without distinctions as to source or use); a change in the mix of tax bases
with a move from income tax towards consumption tax; the flattening of the income tax rates
schedules or/and reduction in the number of tax brackets.1
These tax reforms, far reaching as they are in structural aspects, reflect changes in basic
attitudes to tax policy, with corresponding changes in the level of principle. Horizontal
fairness and tax neutrality have dominated at the cost of vertical equity and redistributive
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elements in taxation. The conflict between the requirement of vertical equity and economic
efficiency that for a long time has been presumed and predicted in theory is now confirmed
in practice by the loss of vertical equity in the income tax structure and in the mix of tax
bases.2 Changes in the position of different types of tax principles are of course not a new
phenomenon. Such changes are expected in the legislative process of liberal democracies in a
dynamically changing world. With respect to the pluralism of tax forms, pluralism may also
be found with respect to fundamental principles of taxation. The different types of
conflicting objectives that have emerged during the last period of tax reforms are in many
ways connected to old and always ongoing basic issues of taxation.
At the most general level one finds the perennial conflict between the fundamental
function of taxation, to provide revenue to finance public expenditures, and economic and
social policy objectives that tend to reduce revenue collections. A principle issue of the same
dimension and of the same importance over time is the distribution of the tax burden. The
normative elements for distribution of the tax burden are horizontal and vertical equity,
neutrality, and redistribution. These standards are in turn parts of a broad political,
philosophical and economical context in both theory and practice. As society and theories
have changed, the normative foundations of how to distribute the tax burden also have
changed over time.
Equitable distribution, vertical or horizontal, is by definition related to the principles
of ability, sacrifice, and benefit, and it reflects the need to justify taxation in the relation
between state and citizen. Redistribution emerges from the use of taxation as an instrument
for welfare policy. Neutrality is based on adjusting taxation to what is understood as an
efficient allocation of resources in the market economy. Concepts of distributive justice and
efficient allocation of resources represent different aspects of the function of public finance.
These concepts may in certain cases even be conflicting.
In tax legislation, the concrete application of theoretical principles of equity,
redistribution and neutrality takes place through applying principles of law on the basis of
ethical, economical and political values and objectives. These fundamental principles of law
therefore act as a meeting point between basic values and objectives of the legislation on the
one hand, and the legal rules formed by statutes and case law on the other hand.
Whatever the choice of distributive principles, the choice must be based on theoretical
and practical tax reform analysis to guide the structural changes in the way intended. The
interpretation and implementation of principles must be clear and open so normative
coherence can be achieved in the tax system in its entirety. The use of principles as a mere
legitimising front creates instability. The equity principles support the justification of the
2 Above nl, 33-34, and Asa Gunnarsson Skatterattvisa (Iustus, Uppsala, 1995) 283-289.
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tax legislation. This is a fundamental issue that no tax legislator in the world can ever get
around.
A The Principles of Equity
The main contours of the different schools of tax theory are relatively easy to discern.
This may be due to the fact that the number of original theoretical solutions to the
distribution problem is limited. Most solutions are simply variations on the same theme.
Principles of distribution can be related to different historic periods and today some may be
found obsolete or of historic interest only. Normally, however, the basic theme has
permanent validity, whereas the variations lose relevance with the change of political
climate.
The individualistic concept of the state comprises different forms of liberalism and
utilitarianism. A characteristic of liberalism is that the similarity of taxation to a voluntary
exchange transaction is taken as a basis for an equitable distribution of a tax burden given
as a function of fiscal concerns. An equitable exchange between state and individual is
expected. The benefit principle is given a concrete form in the Lindahl solution that defines
the willingness to pay for public services in a way similar to the market pricing of goods
and services. A decisive factor in the willingness of the individual taxpayer to pay in
weighing private against public consumption is that the marginal tax for each individual
citizen must not exceed his or her marginal benefit from the government expenditure,
estimated in money terms.
The sacrifice theory developed in the utilitarian world of ideas. Its main tenet is that it
is a sacrifice for the individual to pay tax. The tax burden should imply equal subjective
sacrifice for the individual. A subjective sacrifice is established according to a common
marginal utility curve derived from the decreasing utility of income. The principle of equality
in proportional sacrifice opens up for both a horizontal and a vertical interpretation; the
minimum sacrifice principle based on equality in marginal sacrifice leads to a vertical
concept of equity.4
The theory of ability to pay originally emerged from the philosophical idea of the state as
a social organism in which there exists a mutual dependency between state and individual.
Later, the theory of ability to pay has been taken as a basis for the welfare state view on
the distribution of the tax burden. It is a position of strong general validity that the concept
of ability to pay is the best expression of the ethical idea of distributive equity in tax law.
There are two theoretical interpretations of the theory of ability to pay. One is an equality-
3 Above n 2,96-97, 99-104.
4 Above n2,108-115.
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oriented interpretation, implying horizontal equality of treatment, in line with the possible
interpretation of the principle of equal sacrifice. The other is an interpretation oriented
towards the welfare state, using the concept of ability to pay for the purpose of levelling
incomes and net wealth. Regardless of the approach chosen, the measurement of the
individual taxpaying capacity should be equal to the amount or degree of private needs
satisfaction that the taxpaying citizen can achieve. This position of needs satisfaction can,
in turn, be measured in two different ways. One is to compute the satisfaction of needs from
the origin side; the other makes the calculation on the usage side. The measurement of the
individual's capacity to pay can, accordingly, comprise different acquisitions of means or
resources, such as cash income, yield, benefits, and wealth. The taxpaying capacity can also
be measured by consumption of goods and services. Regardless of which approach is chosen,
the calculation of taxpaying capacity should also be limited to individual capacity in order
to target circumstances limiting the individual satisfaction of needs in relation to the
economic capacity. In tax theory, it is generally felt that income is practically the best
indicator of what represents a person's opportunities for private needs satisfaction. The
best method of assessing the real satisfaction of needs, however, is to measure the
individual's consumption of monetary and other resources.5
The interventionist function of the welfare state is most strongly reflected in the social
policy tax theory. Principles Of social policy and progression aim to use taxation for
equalisation through redistribution of economic resources. The redistribution objective of
taxation has been motivated in different ways. Wagner built on the same hypothesis as the
marginal utility theory, namely that the subjective utility decreases for every utility unit
acquired. He used marginal utility to establish an objective reason for the justification of
progressive taxation. Another such reason is that the ability to pay tax increases in a
higher proportion than the increase in income. The wealthier one is, the easier it is to
increase one's income. A third point of departure is the choice of equality as the ethical
foundation for taxation.6
B The Principles of Neutrality
Tax neutrality implies that the distribution of the tax burden should be neutral in
relation to economic behaviour and that, for this reason, taxation should be non-
interventionist. When discussing the distorting effects of taxes, one should be aware that the
concept of neutrality can be understood in different ways, depending on the level at which it
is applied and to what it is related. Neutrality principles of tax law must, therefore, be
related to the economic policy objective behind them. Neutrality with respect to the
5 Above n 2, 115-124.
6 Above n 2, 127-134.
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allocation of production factors and the principle of competitive neutrality are two
principles of tax neutrality which are related to the neo-classical economic policy
objectives of a tax system. The first principle is directed towards preventing taxation from
impeding economic growth. This principle favours a low tax rate and the avoidance of
interventionist taxation in all areas. The other principle expresses the policy objectives of
not impeding free competition. Competitive neutrality is one of several conceivable partial
neutrality relationships with respect to economic actions. Competitive neutrality can, in
turn, be broken down into several aspects. Regardless of competitive relationships, the
general interpretation of the principle is that alternatives that are economically of equal
value should not be rendered unequal by taxation.7
C Domination and Universality of Principles
The great difference between the equity principles is that the basis for the distribution of
tax burden according to the benefit principle, the principle of equality in proportional
sacrifice and the ability principle, as opposed to the minimum sacrifice principle as well as
the principles of social policy and progression, leads to a horizontal concept of equity.
Individuals with equal taxable capacity or equal interest in collective goods should pay the
same amount in tax. The approaches of both the minimum sacrifice principle and the social
policy oriented principles, in contrast, lead to a vertical concept of equity. For different
reasons, individuals with high taxable capacity should be taxed relatively higher than
those with low taxable capacity. It is common to interpret the ability principle in this way
too, but a diminishing utility approach on the individual taxpaying capacity is
questionable.
What can be stated after examining different tax theories is that there is no objective
basis for establishing what is an equitable distribution of the tax burden. One cannot use
the theory of marginal utility or any theoretical model to establish such an objective
foundation. In contrast, the legislator, by taking a position on a matter of legal policy, can
decide what should be the basic, ethical norm for an equitable taxation of the income,
consumption, or net wealth of individuals. In a pluralistic tax system, where income,
consumption, and net wealth form the tax bases for different types of tax, the legislator may
choose to justify each form of tax by using different ethical arguments. If taxation has to be
neutral with respect to economic actions, it is up to the legislator to choose which economic
policy objective or objectives should form the basis of a neutral distribution of the tax
burden.
Even though the dominance of some principles cannot be consistently delimited and
allocated to definite periods in time, one can still state that the idea of voluntarism in
7 Above n 2, 135-137, 140-141, 144.
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taxation and equivalence between the tax payment by the individual and its counterpart in
public performance do not constitute a rational basis for the tax system in the welfare state.
This idea has therefore been replaced by mandatory taxation in which the principle of
ability to pay is seen to be the best expression of the ethical idea of distributive equity in
tax law. That the benefit theory has never been allowed to dominate the practical
formulation of the tax law does not mean that it is entirely irrelevant. The conflict over how
far the tax system should reflect the taxpayer's ability to pay and how much it should
regard the benefits the taxpayer receives is always there. What should be stressed here is
that one theory of how to distribute the tax burden cannot replace all other theoretical
frameworks. The theories of taxation offer different solutions to the question of what the
basis for the distribution of the tax burden should be, but no single solution is universal.8
D How to Apply the Ability to Pay Principle
As explained above, full normative coherence in relation to the principle of ability to
pay requires that the total economic potential for the individual's needs satisfaction is
included in the income tax base. Moreover, restrictions on the personal satisfaction of
needs, relevant to the ability to pay tax, must be taken into account. This involves three
elements. The income tax base has to be broad. Reduced ability to pay caused by high
maintenance costs must be taken into account, as well as the use of the individual as the tax
unit. The question of tax rates in relation to the ability to pay principle depends entirely on
how these three elements are composed.9
The trend towards successive broadening of the income tax base based on the Haig-
Simons concept of income is therefore in line with the view that income is what establishes a
person's ability to pay tax. But at the same time it is also important to bear in mind that full
adherence to the ability principle demands that the income tax structure consider
circumstances that reduce the ability to pay through instruments like deductions or tax
credits. The individual is the preferred unit for measuring observed income representing the
capacity to pay. In contrast, using the marital unit increases the potential for errors, as the
unit's true ability to pay will in part depend upon the correlation between the primary
8 Above n 2,277.
9 See for example M J Boskin, "Factor Supply and Relationship among Choice of Tax Base, Tax Rates
and the Unit of Account in the Design of an Optimal Tax System", in HJ Aaron and M J Boskin
(eds), The Economics of Taxation, (Brookings Institution Washington, 1980).
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earner's capacity to earn and the number of hours the secondary earner works.10 The
marital tax unit is therefore seen as a defective indicator of ability to pay.11
The equality-oriented interpretation of ability to pay, which has received increasing
attention in the tax reform movements of the 1980s and 1990s and among a majority of tax
analysts, unanimously supports the full taxation of capital gains. With the Haig-Simons
concept of income, horizontal equity will be seriously violated if capital gains are not fully
taxed. Differences in the form of income earned and investment opportunities will be
reflected in the distribution of the tax burden. Taxpayers with the same economic incomes
face the risk of unequal tax treatment.12
Global taxation, where all income from whatever source is aggregated and one rate
schedule is applied, is consistent with the ability principle. A contrasting structure is the
schedular taxation under which each source of income is subject to separate treatment for
rate and base. Differentiated tax on different tax objects means that the calculation of tax is
removed both from the tax subject and from a unitary assessment of the ability to pay tax.
This is in conflict with the core of the principle of ability to pay, namely, a subject-related
ability to perform. The whole idea of a direct income tax as the dominating tax form rests on
this fundamental assumption. The real effect of the schedular income tax system is to leave
the subject-related principle of equal treatment of equal and instead focus on the equal
treatment of equal type of tax object.
Using the ability to pay as the one and only normative foundation for progressive
income taxation or for a net wealth tax, without adding any further component to the
definition of ability to pay tax, is a very questionable approach. In order to motivate a
progressive tax, the concept of ability to pay must also include a postulate of diminishing
marginal benefit, or some similar argument, that attaches a relatively higher ability to pay to
higher incomes than it does to lower ones. This is, of course, perfectly possible as long as it
is assumed that the postulate builds on tax policy value judgements and one does not
erroneously adopt an obsolete scientific view that promotes the postulate to the level of an
economic law of nature. Ability to pay can justify a net wealth tax if net wealth is regarded
as a measurement of ability to pay, independent of income. Funded income offers more
economic safety and hence more ability to pay than non funded income. Disregarding the
w P Apps, "Tax Reform and the Tax Unit" (1984) 1 Australian Tax Forum, 472, and J Grbich, "The
Tax Unit Debate: Notes on the Critical Resources of a Feminist Revenue Law Scholarship" (1990-
91), Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, 512-514.
ii W Chan, "Taxing the Female - as Woman or Wife?", in C Scott (ed), Women and Taxation
(Institute of Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 1993), 64-65.
12 R Krever and N Brooks, A Capital Gains Tax for New Zealand, (Victoria University Press,
Wellington, 1990), 41-44.
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fund theory, net wealth can only represent an independent measurement of ability to pay, if
the income and consumption tax bases are limited, and if there is no death or gift duty. This
allows for the presumption that net wealth to some extent conveys unused economic
capacity.
II INCOME TAX BASE
The existing New Zealand income tax base includes wages and salarieslt business
profits14, returns from assets such as rental income. interest. dividendst: as well as some
realised gains.16 There are two major gaps in the coverage of the New Zealand personal tax
base which are not consistent with the ability to pay principle. First, the base does not
generally include increases in the market value of assets and imputed income from those
assets unless capital gains are realised in the ordinary course of business. Secondly, fringe
benefits are excluded from the personal tax base and instead taxed separately, levied on the
employers.17
Income is not defined in the Income Tax Act, but the courts have, in general, accepted that
income is not a term of art and has to be examined in accordance with ordinary concepts
and usages of people.18 Examination in accordance with ordinary concepts has been
transformed into statutes.19 At a first glance this could be seen as a very generous approach
leading to a very broad definition of income. However, like the courts in all other
Commonwealth countries, the New Zealand courts have chosen to restrict the definition of
income by excluding capital gains.20 Gains of capital nature are not income according to
ordinary concepts.21
13 Income Tax Act 1994, ss CC(1), CD2.
i. Income Tax Act 1994, s CE2.
1, Income Tax Act 1994, s CE1(1)(a).
16 Income Tax Act 1994, ss CD1(1), CD4.
17 The economic incidence of the tax does not necessary follow the legal responsibility for paying the
tax. To what extent the employer carries the economic burden depends on the relation between
the sensitivity of the employers' demand for labour when labour costs increase and the
employees' supply of labour with respect to changes in their real after-tax income. Even so, the
structure of levying the tax on the employer is of significant importance when the issue is to
determine the fulfilment of the ability to pay principle, which will be developed later.
EK Scott U CT (1935) SR (NSW) 215, 219.
19 Income Tax Act 1994, s CD5.
20 Above n 12, 36.
2 1 See for example Burnett's Motor Ltd v CIR (1977) 2 TRNZ 359, and J Prebble, Income Tax Law:
Concepts and Cases (Butterworths Wellington, 1994), 235.
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In what has become a frequently applied definition of income for tax purposes, Justice
Quilliam adopted counsel's submissions about the three principal features of income which
had become recognised in the cases.22 The first was that income is something which comes
in.23 The second was that income imports the notion of periodicity, recurrence and
regularity.24 And the third was that whether or not a particular receipt is income depends
upon its quality in the hands of the recipient."25 These characteristics of income do not take
into account the extent to which a particular receipt is income in terms of adding to an
individual's wealth.26 That is the typical case with capital gains which often are not
realised annually.
A Income v Capital
The important distinction between ordinary income and capital gains is far from clear
as they are not defined in the Income Tax Act. Income from capital falls mainly into one of
three categories: ordinary income, which is capital income interpreted under ordinary
concepts over the years by judges; income derived from the holding or disposition of an
identifiable asset (income on capital account), which traditionally has not been taxable
other than in the course of business; and income on capital account which is made taxable
by explicit provisions in the Income Tax Act, 27 provisions dealing with certain land
transactions,28 certain sales of personal properties29, investment income,30 and commercial
bills.31
Except in cases containing such express inclusions, the courts rely on the assumption
that only income, and not capital, is taxed. Relying on such an assumption places a difficult
task before the courts. Different analogies and statements have been made by the courts to
22 Reid v Commissioner ofInland Revenue [1983] 6 NZTC 61,624.
23 Tennant v Smith [1892] AC 150.
24 FC of T u Dixon (1952) 86 CLR 540, 567-568.
is Scott u FC of T (1966) 117 CLR 514, 526.
26 New Zealand Government Consultative Document on the Taxation of Income from Capital.
(Government Printer, Wellington, 1989), 14.
27 Above n 26, 18.
28 Income Tax Act 1994, s CD 1,
29 Income Tax Act 1994, s CD 4.
30 Income Tax Act 1994, s CE 1.
31 Income Tax Act 1994, s CE 3.
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draw a line between the two concepts.32 One of them is the old, well known distinction
between the fruit and the tree; capital is compared to the tree and income to the crop. The
tree is described as "a reservoir supplied from springs", while the fruit as "the outlet stream,
to be measured by its flow during a period of time.'•33 Traditionally this analogy has been
interpreted to immunise capital gains against income taxation. Capital gains are inseparable
from the underlying capital assets, and therefore cannot constitute income. Krever is one of
those who criticises this traditional distinction of the case. His position is that both income
and capital gains constitute income for income tax purposes. The radical conclusion is that
expanding the income tax base to embrace capital gains is in line with the United States
Supreme Court decision in Eisner v Macomber.34
As already noted, among tax analysts and legislators around the world the support for
full taxation of capital gains is almost unanimous. Contradictory opinions concern the
questions how and when capital gains should be taxed, not if they should be taxed. Should
capital gains be treated as ordinary income or be given some preferential treatment? Should
they be taxed when realised or as they accrue? The same support is given by several major
inquiries in New Zealand.
The first report in 1967, the Ross Committee recommended, with the reservations of
moderate tax rates and the implementation of the proposed income tax package in its
entirety, that realised capital gains be included in the income tax base. The Ross Committee
based its recommendation on grounds of equity, including both the aspect of horizontal
equity as well as the ability to pay. The Ross Committee also emphasised that the "absence
of a capital gains tax tends to encourage the holding of assets for speculative purposes
rather than for productive purposes." Furthermore, it noted that if tax rates were lowered,
as it had recommended, then the tax base would necessarily have to be broadened to include
capital gains.35
In 1982, the opposite position was presented by the so called McCaw Committee,
appointed by the Muldoon Government. The McCaw Committee stated that it was "not
convinced of the need for a separate capital gains tax...even though capital gains are being
made by some which should in principle be taxed. The adoption of the suggestions
32 F Owen The Tax Practitioner 1997 (Butterworths Wellington, 1997), 7-9.
33 The metaphor derives from a decision of the United States Supreme Court, Eisner v Macomber,
(1920) 252 U.S. 189.
34 R Krever "The Ironic Australian Legacy of Eisner v Macomber" (1990) 7 Australian Tax Forum, 191-
206.
35 Report of the Taxation Review Committee Taxation in New Zealand (Government Printer
Wellington, 1967), 18, 405-409.
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concerning determination of business income would substantially meet equity
requirements.',36 The basic arguments presented against a capital gains tax were that it
would yield little revenue. The small amount of revenue would not justify the substantial
complexity which provisions of capital gains would bring into the tax system. The McCaw
Committee also concluded that "the introduction of capital gains in a period of high inflation
would probably bring with it more inequities than it would cure, unless the effects of
inflation were also taken into account.
„37·,
After 1982, several tax analysts and committees have strongly recommended a
comprehensive income tax base including capital gains. Some tax analysts are of the opinion
that the failure to tax capital gains is a fundamental structural flaw in the New Zealand tax
system.38 In 1987, a Committee charged to investigate a comprehensive tax reform admitted
that tax theory produced strong arguments for making no distinction between income and
capital on both the grounds of equity and economic neutrality. The Committee implied that,
despite the theoretical, practical and political difficulties, the only satisfactory solution to
the problem of taxing capital gains would be a comprehensive proposal.39
The Royal Commission on Social Policy, charged to assess how to make New Zealand a
more fair and just society, also strongly recommended that capital gains be taxed. In
assessing the use of the tax system to reduce disparities in income and wealth the
Commission stated:"[v]iewed in terms of fairness (and economic efficiency) the argument for
taxing capital gains is overwhelming.
,•40
In the 1987 "Post Election Briefing", the incoming Government pointed out the
considerable consequences of not including capital gains and losses in income. Difficulties
in adequately taxing returns from investment in land, company shares, and unit trusts,
reflect the exclusion of capital gains from the income tax base. Moreover, many avoidance
schemes exploit the distinction between current and capital income. The Government
„ The Task Force on Tax Reform Report (Government Printer, Wellington, 1982), 235.
37 Above n 36,232.
38 See for example P Bevin, How Should Business Be Taxed? (Victoria University Press Wellington,
1985) 89, A Alston Tax Treatment of Capital Gains in New Zealand, (Victoria University Press
Wellington, 1985) 17, and R Stephens "Radical Tax Reform in New Zealand" (1993) 14 Fiscal
Studies, 61.
39 Consultative Committee on Accrual Tax Treatment of Income and Expenditure Comprehensive
Tax Reform and Possible Interim Solutions (Government Printer, Wellington, 1987), 4.
w Royal Commission on Social Policy Working Papers on income Maintenance Working Paper No 2
(Royal Commission on Social Policy Wellington, 1988), 59.
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planned to address the issue in the accrual regime and in the reform of the taxation of
international income.41
The July 1988 Budget confirmed the Government's intention to introduce a capital gains
tax or, more generally, to improve the system of taxing income from capital. This objective
was pursued by the Labour Government with David Caygill as Minister of Finance, after
Roger Douglas' departure from the Government. A Consultative Committee was set up and in
December 1989, it presented its report.42 The document was the outcome of a comprehensive
review of the then current tax treatment of income from capital. Its central focus was to
identify the aspects of the current treatment that were seen as unfair and inefficient by the
Minister of Finance.43
The Committee stated that the exemption of a wide range of "income on capital account"
(including so-called "capital gains"), was largely a result of historical developments by the
courts. The distinction between taxed and untaxed income was extremely difficult to draw
and was not related to the way people view investment decisions or their own economic
position. The original judicial distinction between ordinary income and capital income had
therefore been considerably modified over a long period by specific statutory provisions
that were narrowly focused and produced anomalies between different taxpayers and
different types of transactions. Taxing some forms of income on capital account while
leaving other forms untaxed merely shifts the boundary between taxed and untaxed income.
This creates problems on the new boundary. The lack of adjustment for inflation in
calculating taxable income was also a main problem pointed out by the Committee.
Concluding that the exemption of certain forms of income on capital account was a
serious deficiency that undermined the fairness of the tax system, increased its costs and
discouraged productive investments, the Committee proposed to remove most of the
exemptions.44 However, the commitment to improving the taxation of income from capital
was shelved before the 1990 General Election. With Labour's, defeat the matter lapsed.45
41 New Zealand Treasury Government Management, Brief to the Incoming Government Vol I, (Treasury
Wellington, 1988) 301-302.
42 C Sandford Successful Tax Reform, Lessons from an Analysis of Tax R€form in Six Countries (Fiscal
Publications Wiltshire, 1993), 57-58.
e New Zealand Government Consultative Document on the Taxation of Income from Capital
(Wellington, 1989), preface I.
44 Above n 43,305-306.
45 Above n 42,58.
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B Fringe Benefits
The Haig-Simons definition of income as the net accretion of a spending unit's power to
consume over some period of time, without distinctions as to source or use, includes both
money, and anything that could be valued in terms of money.46 It is the increase or accretion
of the taxpayer's power to satisfy his or her wants, the so called accretion principle, that
should be included in the income tax base. The definition embraces all types of receipts, in
cash or in kind.47 An important part of the employment remuneration system is the non
monetary advantages provided to employees in addition to wages and salaries. If these
fringe benefits are not subject to tax, there will be substantial economic distortions in the
form of employee compensation. The share of remuneration in the form of untaxed fringe
benefits will inevitable grow larger than the share of cash income leading to erosion of the
income tax base. Obviously both horizontal and vertical equity will be violated.48
New Zealand introduced a quarterly Fringe Benefit Tax (FBT) in April 1985 to ensure
that non-monetary forms of remuneration are subject to tax. However, it is the employer,
who provides employees with benefits, who is liable for the FBT. The reasons for this
change were mainly fiscal, higher revenue and lower administrative costs.49
An employer is defined as a person who pays "source deduction payments" (like salaries
and wages, but also extra emoluments or a withholding tax payment). An employee is
defined as a person who at any time, now, before or in the future, receives a source
deduction payment.50 When first introduced, the FBT was 45% of the taxable value of fringe
benefits. Today the rate is 49% and the FBT is deductible by the employer on an accrual
basis, meaning that the effective rate is 33% for taxpayers, equivalent to the top personal
tax rate.51
The New Zealand FBT identifies five main categories of taxable fringe benefit: the
private use of motor vehicles; low interest loans; free and discounted goods and services;
employer contributions to superannuation, sickness, accident and death benefit funds; and
46 R M Haig, "The Concept of Income - Economic and Legal Aspects" in R M Haig, (ed) The Federal
Income Tax (New York, 1921), 7.
47 D J Collins "Taxation of Fringe Benefits - An Economist's Perspective" (1987) 4 Australian Tax
Forum, 97-98.
48 C Scott "Taxing Fringe Benefits: The New Zealand and Australian Experience" in C Sandford
(ed), Key Issues in Tax Rform (Fiscal Publications, Wiltshire, 1993) 22 and 35-36.
49 Above n 32, 21-22, and Above n 43,36-38.
50 Income Tax Act 1994, s OB 1.
51 Income Tax Act 1994, s ED 2. Also above n 32, 21-12 and above n 48,24.
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lump sum retiring allowances and some categories of redundancy payments.52 Even if the tax
base covers most fringe benefits provided by employers to their employees, it is still not
consistent with the ability to pay principle. By imposing the FBT on the employer, a large
part of the individual's total potential for needs satisfaction is excluded from the personal
income tax base. Both horizontal and vertical equity demand a tax structure based on
subject-related ability to perform, which is what the concept of global taxation supplies. All
income has to be calculated and imposed on the individual taxpayer, and one rate schedule
applied. A split in the individual's tax capacity, such as the FBT, opens up the potential for
unequal treatment of taxpayers in similar economic circumstances, particularly where more
than one marginal tax rate exists.53
C The Tax Unit
New Zealand's tax system has been largely designed around the individual as the unit of
assessments, a fact that makes New Zealand unusual compared to most other OECD
countries. Marriage or de facto relationship does not influence tax liabilities, except when
couples have dependent children. Different types of tax credits for family support use the
aggregate parental income to determine the size of the tax reduction. This means that the unit
of assessment for income tax is, as a main rule, free from presumptions such as the
dependency of women on their husbands' income or that married people are better able to
pay tax because they are married rather than single.54
New Zealand's most comprehensive tax reform policy statement on the unit of taxation
was the McCaw Report from 1982. The report recommended adopting a marital tax unit
because, in the absence of joint filing of aggregate income, principles of tax equity were
offended. At the horizontal level, family units of equal income were not taxed similarly,
preferences being given to those family units with more than one earner. The Task Force
saw the married couple as the appropriate tax unit because the inherent economies of living
together increase a couple's welfare and its ability to pay.55 In the search for the ideal
horizontal equity between couples, the McCaw Report came up with a proposal which
would favour married couples with a considerable disparity in individual incomes over
other taxpayers. Typically, disparity will be greater when the secondary income-earner
does not work full-time, in which case there will already be error in the observation of
52 Income Tax Act 1994, s CI 1.
53 Above n 48,36-38.
54 S St John "The Tax/Benefit Interface" in Scott above n 11, 135-136.
55 Above n 36,95.
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ability to pay. Despite the recommendation in the McCaw Report, the legislative response
has been to maintain the individual as the appropriate tax unit.56
D Tax on Wealth
As described above, the ability to pay principle could hardly be used as a normative
foundation to advocate a net wealth tax, unless the income tax base is limited, which is the
case for New Zealand. New Zealand has no annual tax on the stock of wealth. No estate
duty is payable on the estate of any person dying on or after 17 December 1992. The Estate
Duty Abolition Act 1993 abolished estate duty by reducing the rate to nil. The legislation,
however, remains in place. The only existing tax on wealth is a gift duty on wealth
transfers. The Government at one stage announced its intention to repeal gift duty if
appropriate measures could be found to avoid unlimited gifting as an instrument for tax
planning, or to avoid abuse of targeted social welfare payments. This has not occurred and
may never occur.57
Substantial exemptions meant that the majority of land in New Zealand remained
outside the tax base, giving rise to distortions and unfairness in its application. The estate
duty was as Sandford put it, a sorry spectacle, based on the wrong principles for a death
duty.58 The Government faced the alternative of either broadening the base to include land
currently exempt or abolishing the tax.s The land tax issue in New Zealand demonstrates
the interaction among political factors, property market forces, and tax system reform. When
inflation, and a property boom produced by the global financial deregulation, tested the
tax's political and economic viability, abolition not reform was the unexpected outcome.
The New Zealand abolition of land tax is judged as an atypical response to the policy
problem of dealing simultaneously with land taxation, inflation, and the taxation of capital
gains; this approach is not likely to be repeated elsewhere.60
Without an annual wealth tax or inheritance-type of wealth transfer tax, or a
comprehensive income tax base including capital gains, a large part of the net accretion of
assets and imputed income from those assets will remain untaxed. This is an anomaly in a
tax system based on the ability to pay principle. In order to achieve horizontal equity,
Sandford has proposed the introduction of an annual wealth tax in New Zealand with
56 Chan, above n 11, 54, 63 and 65.
57 Above n 32,25-2.
58 C Sandford Taxing Wealth in New Zealand (The Institute of Policy Studies, Wellington, 1987), 48.
59 D Caygill Budget Announcements (New Zealand Government Wellington, 24 July 1990), 107.
w B F Reece "The Abolition of Land Tax in New Zealand. Searching For Causes And Policy Lessons"
(1993), 10 Australian Tax Forum, 242-244.
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moderate rates on a relatively broad base. He has also proposed a complementary
accessions tax to replace the former estate and the present gift taxes with the intent to
reduce inequalities in wealth-holding.61
E Income Support Through the Tax System
There have been different types of financial assistance available to families in New
Zealand. A common objective throughout has either implicitly or expressly been the
prevention of poverty, investment in children, and the horizontal redistribution of income.
Measures implemented have included allowances, tax exemptions and rebates, minimum
wages, and benefits.62 Presently the principal forms of assistance are family support,
guaranteed minimum family income, childcare subsidy, domestic purposes benefit, widow's
benefit, orphan's benefits, and unsupported child's benefit.63 The low income earner rebate
(LIR) for New Zealand resident taxpayers in receipt of non-investment income is also part
of the family assistance programme. In addition to the tax relief provided to low income
earning individuals, by way of LIR and the transitional tax allowance, significant
financial assistance is also provided to low and middle income earning families with
dependent children by way of the Family Support Tax Credit (FSTC), the Independent
Family Tax Credit (IFTC) and a Guaranteed Minimum Family Income (GMFI).64 Assistance
is administered by the Department of Social Welfare (DSW) to welfare beneficiaries, and by
the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) to low-income families.65 The Family Support Scheme
took effect from 1 October 1986 and included the FSTC and GMFI. Depending on
circumstances, families may be eligible for both forms of assistance. FSTC function as an
income supplement to both working and non-working families, whereas GMFI is not
available to those people receiving an income-tested benefit.66 The FSTC can be categorised
as vanishing credits and the GMFI as a form of work-related subsidy.67
6 i Above n 58, 51.
62 C March "Financial Assistance to Families in New Zealand" in Scott (above n 11, 115.
o W R Atkin Social Security Inw - Suppl 5, New Zealand (Kluwer Law International, The Hague,
1996),49.
64 Inland Revenue The New Zealand Tax System (New Zealand Government September, 1996).
65 Above n 62, 115.
„• Above n 32,18-5.
67 J R Kesselman Rate Structure and Personal Taxation: Flat Rate or Dual Rate? (Victoria University
Press Wellington, 1990), 58.
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F Low Income Earner Rebate: those people receiving an income-tested benefit.
From 1 July 1997, the bottom tax rate is reduced to 19.5 cents on the dollar and the
threshold separating the bottom and the top tax rates increased to $38,000. However, the
rebate implies that taxpayers who earn most of their income from employment or self-
employment, and all superannuitants, face a tax scale which effectively has three tax rates -
15 cents on the dollar for the first $9,500 of income, 21 cents on the dollar for income
between $9,500 and $38,000 and 33 cents on the dollar for income above $38,000. The
middle effective tax rate is a result of the structure of the LIR. The last year's changes
concentrated on reducing the second effective tax rate as this is the rate faced by the
majority of low-and middle-income earners. It has been reduced by a total of 7 cents on the
dollar over a couple of years.68 The rebate can be summarised as an earnings subsidy.69
G Family Support Tax Credit
Families are eligible for FSTC based on the number of dependent children and the
combined family income. Entitlement is on a graduated scale.70 Where the family income is
below specified thresholds (the thresholds change depending on the number of children), the
entitlement per child is the maximum amount. However, once the family income exceeds the
thresholds, the entitlement gradually decreases for each additional dollar of income, until it
is finally extinguished. 71
The 1997 abatement levels, or income test, which set out how a family's incomen affects
the annual amount of Family Support, made the full amount of Family Support available
when family income is below $20,000. It reduces at the rate of 18 cents in the dollar of
family income between $20,000 and $27,000, and by 30 cents in the dollar on family income
68 W Birch, Tax Reduction and Social Policy Programme-Details., (1996), 22-24, and Inland Revenue,
(1996).
w Above n 67,58.
90 From 1 July 1997, FSTC up to $60 per week is paid for the eldest child and each additional child
aged 16 years or over, up to $47 for the first or only child aged under 16 years , up to $40 for each
additional child over 13 years and up to $32 for each additional child under 13 years. (Income Tax
Act 1994, s KD2(2).)
n Birch, above n 68, and March, above n 62, 115.
72 In this context a family's income refers just to the income of the principal caregiver and his or
her spouse, if any. The incomes of any other family members, such as the child or grandparents
living in the house, are not counted as family income for abatement purposes. (Birch, above n 68,
.
29)
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above $27,000 (which means $1,260 plus 30 cents per dollar of specified income exceeding
$27,000).73
Although income tax liability is based on individual incomes, the amount of FSTC
entitlement is based on spouses' aggregated income. Family Support was previously paid to
each spouse in equal shares. However, as of the 1991 income year, two-parent families who
are living together no longer have their Family Support entitlement split. The full amount of
the tax credit is to be paid to the principal caregiver4 of a dependent child.75 The definition
of "spouse" is wide, and includes "relationships in the nature of marriage", including de facto
situations but does not include a separated spouse.76 A two-step approach is used to
determine the family income. Firstly, income is calculated using all the provisions of the Act
except those dealing with the tax credits. Secondly, this figure is adjusted under s KD 1 in
the Act for certain items which must be added to determine entitlement to family support. 77
The same amount of family assistance now applies to those both in, and out of, the
workforce. When FSTC is delivered through the tax system, the level of FSTC abates once
income exceeds a particular income level. Social Welfare beneficiaries entitled to FSTC who
have no other significant income receive the full amount of support along with payments
from the DSW.78 The Family Benefit, a non-taxable universal benefit of $6 a week per child,
was amalgamated with Family Support in 1991/92 so that all family assistance is now
reduced against combined parental income.79
H Guaranteed Minimum Family Income
The GMFI is a tax credit that supplements the incomes of low-wage working families
with dependent children, from 1 July 1997 up to a fixed amount of $290 after tax per week,
or $15,080 net annual income.8 Family Support is payable on top of this. This means that
the GMFI is an "after tax" income guarantee and is delivered in the form of FSTC. In these
circumstances it becomes a negative income tax. To qualify for GMFI, a solo parent has to
be employed for at least 20 hours a week, and a couple has to have a combined total of at
73 Income Tax Act 1994, s KD2(4) and Birch, above n 68,28-29.
74 The principal caregiver is defined in the Income Tax Act 1994, s OB 1, as the person who has the
primary responsibility for the day-to-day care of the child.
75 March, above n 62, 116.
76 Income Tax Act 1994, s OB 1, and above n 32, 18-5.
77 Above n 32, 18-5.
78 March, above n 62, 115-116.
ig Aboven 54,137.
80 Income Tax Act 1994, s KD3(2) and (3) and Birch, above n 68,30.
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least 30 hours a week of employment.81 This benefit structure carries a very high marginal
tax for additional hours of work in either part-time or full-time weeks. It also taxes
increases in the worker's hourly or weekly pay rate in proportion to the weeks worked per
year.82
I Independent Family Tax Credit
In 1996 a new Independent Family Tax Credit was enacted. IFTC is a credit separate
from and additional to the income tax rate reductions and increases in Family Support. The
IFCT is a simple, single amount ($15/week) per child regardless of age. For eligible families,
IFTC is payable in addition to Family Support. The combined amount is subject to the same
income test that applies to Family Support. The abatement applies to the Family Support
amount first, and then, when that has been exhausted. to the IFTC amount.83
Through this credit, an extra reduction in taxes is targeted to low and middle income
working families who are supporting children and who are not reliant on substantial
assistance from income-tested social security benefits, student allowances, New Zealand
Superannuation or the Accident Compensation scheme. The purpose behind the new IFI'C
was mainly to solve two equity problems. The first problem was based on the opinion that
low and middle income families with children face higher maintenance costs than
households without dependent children. Maintenance expenses generated by full-time
employment erode the margin of income from paid work over benefit income. The
introduction of IFTC was expected to ease the tax burden on these families. The other equity
problem was based on the fact that the system tended to lock people in, discouraging
beneficiary families from seeking economic independence. By introducing the new IFTC
together with higher rates of Family Support, the Minister of Finance, Bill Birch, hoped to
allow families to earn more income before all their family tax relief is used up.84 It is
questionable to regard this as an equity problem; it is more a question of reducing the
negative effects on work incentives created by the system. The ITFC scheme must be analysed
from the ideology presented by the incoming National Government in October 1990. The
Government's policy was to ensure that those in genuine need have adequate access to
government assistance and that those who can make greater provision for their own needs
should be encouraged to do so. Self-reliance was a key principle in this context.85
81 Birch, above n 68,30 and March, above n 62, 116.
82 Above n 67,60.
83 Income Tax Act 1994, s KD2(3) and (4).
84 Birch, above n 68, 31-34.
85 J Boston "The Decent Society? Essays in Response to National's Economic and Social Policies"
Boston, and L Dalziel, (eds), (Auckland, 1992), 6-7. See further J B Bolger, R Richardson, and W F
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f Family Support and the Ability to Pay
Even if stereotyped in structure, these tax reliefs together with the guaranteed minimum
income constitute a much more far-reaching attempt to target low and middle income eamers
with reduced ability to pay tax caused by high maintenance costs, than would a zero-rate
bracket in the tax schedule. How the ability to pay principle has been decisive for the
development of this structure is unclear. It is obvious that a fairer distribution of the tax
burden has been of central concern when initiating the process of increased targeting.
However, it seems as if the general policy of targeting benefits has come to dominate the
development. How the combined impact of taxes and benefits on the distribution of income
meets the ability to pay tax is still an open question.
IV NEW TRENDS
The excessive emphasis on efficiency and excess burden based on the almost dogmatic
concept of efficiency provided by the optimal tax analysis have been shown to be a dead end
for the design of tax systems. To achieve tax neutrality the optimal tax approach in its
extreme stresses the need for selectivity and unequal rate taxation. This is contradictory to
the comprehensiveness and uniformity of tax treatment called for in the broad-based and
rate flattened income tax and direct or indirect consumption tax structure developed during
the last fifteen years. Optimal taxation is therefore no longer seen as a constructive guide to
tax policy.86
A more modest assessment of potential efficiency gains could therefore be expected in tax
reform designs at the end of the 1990s and beyond. With increasing social concern over
widening inequality and rising unemployment, it would not be surprising if politicians
chose to reintroduce social norms as guiding principles for tax legislation. This could invite
a return to an intervening income tax structure and increasing support for progressive
income taxation. The domination and content of the horizontal equity principle and
neutrality principles will be questioned. Another scenario is a new awareness of the
necessity to better co-ordinate tax and social welfare structures in order to get people,
especially women, out of the poverty trap87 and economic dependency and into the
Birch Economic and Social Initiative., Statements to the House of Representatives, (The Government
Wellington, 1990).
86 Above n 1, 37, and A A Tait "Not So General Equilibrium and Not So Optimal Taxation" (1989) US
Public Finance, and J G Head "Tax Fairness Principles: A Conceptual, Historical and Practical
Review" (1992) 9 Australian Tax Forum, 84-97.
87 The situation where the "the combined effect of income taxation and abatement of benefits for
any increase in non-benefit income results in beneficiaries or low income earners receiving little or
no additional reward for increased work effort." (IE Brashares, and J P Smith "Poverty Traps in
New Zealand" (1991) 8 Australian Tax Forum, 63.)
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workforce.88 The issue of interface between the tax and benefit systems is of great concern in
New Zealand. A lack of integration and consistency have emerged from separate
developments concerning tax and income maintenance policies.89 Many tax analysts are of
the opinion that women are particularly disadvantaged by this lack of consistency, based
on the fact that women are over-represented among the poor in New Zealand and heavily
dependent on the state as a provider of transfers and services. Women are also the dominant
clients of the Income Support Service.91
By the early 1980s, the main part of social expenditure in New Zealand, including
education, health care, and some forms of income, was largely non-means-tested. The
welfare system had primarily been based on a mixture of the residualist and right-based
models. The policy shift from the mid-1980s and forward towards a minimal welfare state
with a much more targeted social policy regime - a shift rooted in economic depression and
neoliberal winds - initiated a radical restructuring of the welfare state. Implemented first by
the fourth Labour Government (1984-1990) and then by the incoming conservative
Government, the restructuring has involved significant cuts in income support together with
a tightening of eligibility criteria. There has been a move away from universal programmes
to a more tightly targeted social assistance system.92 During the same period, the Labour
Government made radical changes in the tax system: a substantial flattening of the tax rate
scale and a greater reliance on indirect taxes with the introduction of a comprehensive
VAT. The purpose was to reduce the progression in order to minimise the efficiency costs of
high effective marginal tax rates (EMTRgb as they have a negative effect on work
incentives.
A Inte#ace Issues and labour market participation Of women
Personal income tax together with social security contributions, clearly play a
predominant role in any how taxation may influence social or economic behaviour.
However, it is difficult to establish the relationship between taxation and the incentives to
88 Above n 1,40, and G B Peters The Politics of Taxation: A Comparative Perspective (Blackwell
Cambridge 1991), 289.
89 Above n 54, 135.
90 See Scott above n 11.
91 A de Bruin "Implications of the Welfare State and Its Restructuring for New Zealand Women: A
Feminist Critique" 172-185, in Scott, above n 11,173.
92 Boston above n 85 at 5-6 and De Bruin above n 91, 172.
93 "EMTR measure how much of an additional dollar of private income is paid to the government in
taxes and/or the withdrawal of income tested benefits, and indicate where poverty traps may
occur." Above n 87,63.
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work. A basic problem for any income tax system, the problem of equal importance for work
supply, is the question of what the relative treatment of taxpayers in different working and
family situations should be.
A woman's economic independence can be measured by the share of family income, which
in turn depends on the cross effects of the participation rate of men and women in the labour
market, the number of hours worked, the wage ratios of women relative to men, and taxes
and social security contributions. Gustafsson and Bruyn-Hundt point out that women's
decisions to enter and remain in the labour market are dependent on whether their work
increases family after-tax income above what their household production is worth to the
family. Gustafsson and Bruyn-Hundt have determined four important factors in looking at
the incentives or disincentives of the tax and the social security systems for women's
participation in the labour market. The four factors are the choice of the tax unit (joint or
separate taxation), the method of determining income, allowances and deductions, and
whether the tax rate is linear, progressive, or regressive.w Some examples of these interface
issues, traced in the New Zealand tax and benefit systems, are given below.
B Income
The definition of income has become important for both the social security system and
health benefits as there has been a move away from free health care.
The general definition of income in that area provides that income in relation to any
persons:95
(a) Means any money received or the value in money's worth of any interest acquired,
before income tax, by the person which is not capital (except as hereinafter set out);
and;
(b) Includes, whether capital or not and as calculated before the deduction (where
applicable) of income tax, any periodical payments made, and the value of any credits
or services provided periodically, from any source for income-related purposes and
used by the person for income-related purposes;...
The meaning to be given to income for benefit purposes is wider than the meaning
normally ascribed to income for income tax purposes. In a recent case, the Judge weighed the
principal features of income recognised in the casesm and the wide ranging definition of
94 S Gustafson, and M Bruyn-Hundt "Incentives for Women to Work: a Comparison between the
Netherlands, Sweden and West Germany" (1991) 18 Journal Of Economic Studies, 30-31.
95 Social Security Act 1964, s 3(1)
g The Judge recognised in this context specially the principles stated in Reid u Commissioner of Inland
Revenue [1983] 6 NZTC 61, 624.
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income in the Social Security Act, designed to capture all forms of money used to
maintenance of person or family. An important point made by the Judge was that an
essential quality of income is when the income truly adds to the resources of the person
receiving them. In this respect, loans are disqualified as they are available without regard
to need in general terms and must be repaid. The Judge also stated that if Government sees
taking out a loan to assist with living expenses as disentitling a student to other needs-
based social welfare assistance then it should make that plain by clear legislative
expression.97 This judgment illustrates that an integrated approach is required if the goal is
to create a unified definition of income, especially since family support has become an
integrated part of the income tax system. It has not been the ambition of this article to
provide comprehensive coverage of all types of income definition in tax and social
legislation. Despite its limitations, this study has reviewed, from both a substantial and a
technical respect, three ways in which income can be defined - the general definition for tax
purposes, the definition of family income used to determine entitlement for family support,
and the definition in the Social Security Act.
C Unit OfAssessment
In contrast to the tax system, the benefit system in New Zealand has traditionally used
the couple as the unit of assessment. Thus ordinary social security benefits, such as
sickness, unemployment and invalids' benefits, are paid at a lower rate for married persons
than for single persons and are assessed according to joint income. The lower rate implies
some economies are possible for married people that are not available to people who simply
live together. The income test implies income sharing, as an unemployed woman or man may
lose all entitlement to the benefit because of their spouses' income. The amount of income
exempt from the social security income test is the same for the married couple as for a single
person. According to St John this implies a penal treatment of marriage.98 On top of this, to
determine what is and what is not a marriage-like situation is notoriously difficult
question. The applicant for a benefit must not be "living together with her husband or his
wife or with the other parent of the child, as the case maybe.'m The words "husband" and
"wife" are given an extended meaning to include those who have been living together in a de
facto relationship, understood as a relationship in the nature of marriage. The traditional
approach to the existence of a de facto relationship involved proof first of actual
cohabitation and, secondly of the mental intention evidenced by such factors, weighted
97 Director-General of Social Security uKeM Unreported, 7 Feb 1996, High Court, Wellington Registry,
AP 255/95.
98 Above n 54, 135-136.
99 Social Security Act 1964, Section 27B(2)( c), SSA.
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individually:" A good example of this approach is given in Mauri v Department of Social
Welfare. A woman was convicted of making false statements with respect to her
relationship with a man who came and went from her home as he pleased. The quality of the
relationship was very low, the man often being drunk, and not contributing financially.
Without more, the judge might have been inclined to say that the relationship was not in the
nature of marriage. However, the woman had also borne the man three children. The court
took into account other factors such as the length of the relationship, its degree of
permanence, living conditions, the existence of sexual relations, financial arrangements,
evidence of commitment to the interests of the other, sharing of leisure time activities, how
the couple presented themselves to outsiders, and whether the relationship was exclusive of
third persons.101 However, recently the Court of Appeal in Ruka v DSW adopted a
somewhat new approach when deciding that financial interdependence is an essential
element in a relationship in the nature of marriage.102
Inconsistency also exists within the tax system. As shown above, the family support
scheme is income-tested on a joint income basis. The income test is based on the family as a
unit for assessment. The abatement of this type of tax credit therefore does not coincide with
the rest of the income tax system which is based on the individual as a unit. This family
support scheme means that the tax system contains both individual and joint taxation. It is
in conflict with the ability to pay principle. Income testing a substitute for a benefit which
was previously universally available will effectively increase the marginal tax rate for the
secondary earner in the family. It can be expected that the overall impact of the income test
will be to encourage further dependency, as well as an efficiency loss to the economy which
is all the greater owing to the special sensitivity of labour supply by secondary earners to
marginal tax rates. 103
D EMTR and Family Support
The targeting regimes counteracted the fourth Labour Government's purpose to reduce
progression by introducing an almost pure dual rate tax schedule. It is obvious that the
targeted combination of low income rebate, credit on top of credit, and guaranteed minimum
income raise effective marginal and average effective tax rates above the 19.5% basic rate
for persons at lower to middle incomes, a significant part of the population. The main
sources today of high EMTRs are benefit and Family Support abatement and the GMFI, not
1 00 See further W R Atkin, Living Together Without Marriage: The Law in New Zealand (Butterworths,
Wellington, 1991) 13-29.
101 (1987) 4 NZFLR 481.
102 [1997] 1 NZLR 154.
1 {13 Chan, above n 11, 67.
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the income tax scale in itself. 104 In fact, many low income earners face higher average
effective tax rates than higher income individuals do. For low income individuals who
receive significant net benefits the tax system therefore is regressive. 105 This shows the
tensions between trying to minimise the cost of tax expenditures providing horizontal
equity between different sizes of family, providing an adequate minimum income, ensuring
vertical equity, and minimising the efficiency costs of high effective marginal tax rates.106
The National Government has tried to overcome the EMTR problems. One of the most far
reaching proposals was presented by the Change Team on the Targeting of Social
Assistance, set up by the Government to design a new and integrated system. The policy
document that emerged 107 was the background paper for the wide-ranging reforms
announced in the 1991 budget where two new concepts were introduced, the "core family"
and "family accounts". All income support would be based on a single income test, a single
income exemption, a single rate and uniform abatement levels. For this global system the core
family should be the new unit of assessment.108 However, the definition of a family unit
could not be translated to a workable practical solution for welfare abatement. In mid-
1993, it was announced that the work on family accounts had been abandoned. However,
implementation of more tightly targeted welfare policies proceeded.109
Conclusions made by Inland Revenue predict that the high effective marginal tax rates
facing low income earners on benefits reduces the overall efficiency of the tax system, and
that the equity implications can be interpreted as such as the EMTRs mean that
redistribution in the current family support tax credit regime has become inefficient.
Targeting benefits for equity and fiscal cost reasons need, therefore, to be weighed against
the potential efficiency costs associated with imposing relatively high effective marginal tax
rates on beneficiaries. 110
It is obvious that the combination of the flattening of income tax rates and an increase of
targeted benefits have been disadvantageous for women in their role as secondary earners
104 Above n 87,77-78 and above n 67,58.
105 Inland Revenue, Supplementary Briefing Paper, Vol 2, (October 1996).
1()6 Stephens, above n 38, 50-51 and 61.
107 Change Team on Targeting Social Assistance, Report of the Change Team on Targeting Social
Assistance. (Wellington, 1991).
108 Jenny Shipley et al Social Assistance. Welfare that Works a Statement of Government Policy on Social
Assistance (New Zealand Government, Wellington, 1991).
109 Above n 54, 138-140.
i i o Inland Revenue, Supplementary Briefing Paper, Vol 2, (October 1996).
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in households with dependent children or in their role as solo mothers. The legislators have
failed to design an income tax system with a uniform and consistent definition of income.
Another inconsistency is that the individual as a unit of assessment is not generally
applicable. St John predicts further complexities if the trend of using different definition of
incomes for specific targeting measures to reduce gross inequities remains.111 I am prepared
to agree. The picture becomes even more complex if one consider that the income tax base is
not as comprehensive as would be desirable from an ability to pay perspective. This means
that a taxpayer receiving tax relief based on the Family Support scheme may have an
untaxed economic capacity derived from income like capital gains. The existing situation
suggest that a closer consideration of what and whose ability should be targeted would be
a fruitful strategy in future tax reforms.
i 11 Above n 54,135,140 and 145.
